
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29 October 1954

MINISTER PURE THE THE PERMITTER OF COLUMN TWEELTHERS.

ANDIECT: Navious of 32-4, "Intelligence Deplications of a Consum and Verification of Armed Repost and Armedante," 12 they 1951

- position on dissipation with the current EM policy review of the US position on dissipation, the Deard of Schland Sections has reviewed SS-4 and concludes that it is exist appearably relid. While a comman and varification of processes is not appearably lookeded in the broad disappearable propagate now before the USA, we exceed that some much procedure yould be an integral part of any detailed disappearable.
- 2. In this event the intelligence implications and atill to gonerally the same as when NP-4 was properly, with the following qualifications:
  - is of Discussion), we believe that the DESE would now stand to get mere that the DESE would now stand to get mere that the DESE would now stand to get mere that the DESE would now stand to get mere that the DESE and the state of the medient art the Ser made intelligence to your posts the DESE is now primarily the nature of weapons stockplied (so so indicator of plans for use and of the evaluation of new production and delivery techniques). In the other hand, we continue to believe that the DESE valid gain more intelligence than it would lose in an inspection system confined to the mining, proceeding, and production of finatoriable materials (confiding any radical new developments), in view of the extent to which each information has already began
  - b. With respect to disclosure of non-maximar respects and development (pure. St of Maximaton), we believe that the SERM's greatest need to probably for date on our most named time and solventifically advanced projects. Since the SERM probably still last namedat being the US in root of those fields (though less

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so them in 1951), it would gain more than the is from imprection of much projects. On the other hand, Soviet intelligence on local monetime projects in rotably good, largely because so such information appears in our open literature. Thus the US would gain from equal disclosure of these majories. For example, it intelligence is shelly insdequente in the guided missile field, where a major switch threat is believed to be developing, while Soviet intelligence has probably guined a great feel from its peak intelligence has probably guined a great feel from its peak intelligence has probably guined a great feel from its peak intelligence to be developing, while speak intelligence has probably guined a great feel from its peak intelligence of all but the propositive appoints of placelle research and involved a peak would greatly benefit the US.

said verification to its simulation. (Conclusion 5 of 35-4), to minimize this risk so re-emphasise our conduction that "each phone and vithin it, each step in the inspection process, should be carried out simultenessaly in the US and UNSO (Conclusion 54 of 35-4), and that there should be character reciprosity at each stage.

FOR THE POLICE OF PARTICULAR DESTRICTION

CHAN AVIOUR.



<sup>&</sup>quot;As an example the current issue of accrising friction (25 October 1954) contains a surprisingly complete review of the W stantle program, as compared with our extremely limited knowledge of the specific Saviet program as given in a recent retimal ections, NTT 11-6-16.